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relief did not put the ownership of Gaskin Pond's waters at issue, the
court held the circuit court erred in granting Bay house fee simple
ownership of the waters within Gaskin Pond.
The court ultimately held Bay House's failure to allege ownership
of the pond water within the pleadings precluded the circuit court
from making a decision on the issue. Viewing the substance of the
litigant's pleading with paramount importance, the court reversed the
circuit court's holding regarding the water ownership.
Aimee Wagstaff

State Water Control Bd. v. Crutchfield, 578 S.E.2d 762 (Va. 2003)
(holding the Virginia Court of Appeals abused its discretion in
denying a request to amend a petition, where the request was timely
and the record lent no support to the denial).
Frances B. Crutchfield and her son, Henry R. Broadus (collectively,
"Crutchfield"), filed an appeal asking the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond, Virginia, to invalidate a permit the State Water Control
Board ("Board") granted to Hanover County. The permit allowed
Hanover County to discharge up to ten million gallons per day of
treated wastewater into the Pamunkey River adjacent to Crutchfield's
In response, the Board filed a demurrer asserting
property.
Crutchfield lacked standing to pursue an appeal.
The circuit court overruled the demurrer, holding the petitioners
alleged standing by claiming injury to the historic sites located on their
However, the court then dismissed the appeal with
property.
prejudice on the ground that Crutchfield failed to establish standing,
because she could not demonstrate any actual or imminent injury.
The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded
the case for a hearing on the merits of the petition, holding
Crutchfield had standing to challenge the Board's issuance of the
permit. The Board and Hanover County appealed from the court of
appeals' judgment, and the Supreme Court of Virginia granted
certiorari.
Before alleging that Crutchfield lacked standing, the Board
attempted to disqualify Crutchfield's appeal on procedural grounds.
The Virginia Supreme Court declined to adopt this view, holding the
trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in spite of Crutchfield's
failure to serve Hanover County as a necessary party at the time she
filed her petition for appeal. While the Board urged the court to view
this defect as fatal to the case, the court ruled Crutchfield's timely
filing of original petition and notice of appeal served to preserve
jurisdiction in the court of appeals, which had the discretion to grant
leave to amend.
The court next considered the Board's contention that the court
of appeals abused its discretion by granting Crutchfield leave to amend
the allegations of her original petition in defiance of a local rule
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mandating that the original petition state why Crutchfield believed the
Board's activities were unlawful. The Board argued Crutchfield failed
to allege harm to her recreational enjoyment as a result of the
permitted discharge.
The Virginia Supreme Court found the
argument unpersuasive. A letter attached to the original petition
satisfied the local rule's pleading requirement by detailing the ways in
which recreational enjoyment would suffer as a result of the discharge.
The court noted that the local rule the Board cited vested the
authority to grant or deny a request to amend in the court of appeals,
but that a refusal to allow such an amendment-when timely filed and
in no way prejudicial to the Board-must find support in the record.
The court found no such support existed.
The Board next argued that the court of appeals erred in
determining Crutchfield had standing. The court observed that the
location and nature of Crutchfield's property easily allowed her to
allege two elements necessary for standing: actual or imminent injury
fairly traceable to a Board decision.
Finally, the court observed that the court of appeals could have
redressed Crutchfield's harm with a favorable decision, thereby
satisfying the third requirement for standing. The court remanded
the case to the court of appeals for a trial on the merits.
CurtisGraves

WASHINGTON
Pruitt v. Douglas County, 66 P.3d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that where a county's improvements made properties valuable,
homeowners had a cause of action against the county for subsequently
making improvements which flooded and destroyed homeowners'
properties).
In the 1930s, Douglas County made certain road improvements,
which reduced the natural flow of water across properties owned by
the Fletchers and the Pruitts (collectively, "Homeowners") from fifteen
cubic feet per second ("c.f.s.") to one to two c.f.s. A developer built
Homeowners' homes in 1967. In 1986 and 1993, Homeowners
purchased their properties. Between 1995 and 1997, the county made
certain road improvements, which resulted in flooding of
Homeowners' properties in 1997. Homeowners sued the county on
the basis of negligence, strict liability, trespass, and inverse
condemnation. The county motioned for summaryjudgment, and the
Superior Court for Chelan County granted this motion. Homeowners
appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, Division Three
("court"). The court reviewed de novo the trial court's grant of the
county's motion for summary judgment and noted that the moving
party's burden in summary judgment is to show, in the light most

